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RATIONALE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
By HUGH EVANDER WILLIS0
The law of contracts includes all the social control applied
to promises. It, of course, includes, first, social control
applied to promises in the form of contracts. This is the
most important part of the law of contracts, but it is broader
than and includes more than contracts. It also includes,
second, social control applied to promises made with a view
to contracts but before any contracts arise, third, social con-
trol applied to promises made to discharge contracts, fourth,
social control applied to promises which are not allowed to be-
come contracts, and, fifth, social control applied to promises in
the form of contracts which are allowed to be avoided. In
the case of contracts the social control involves rights. In
the case of promises preliminary to contracts, the social
control relates to privileges and power. In the social control
applied to promises made to discharge contracts the social
control relates to rights. In the case of the avoidance of
promises in contracts the social control relates to privileges
and powers. In the case of promises not allowed to become
contracts the social control relates to a situation where there
are no powers, privileges or rights (other than public)
Where rights are involved the social control may result in
specific performance, or restitution, or damages for breach.
Where privileges and powers are involved the social control
may result either in a judicial finding of a contract or in a
decree rescinding a contract as the case may be. Where there
are no rights (except public), powers or privileges the social
control may consist either in non-action or in an independent
criminal proceeding.
*Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
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I
A contract is a legal obligation created by the law because
of a promise or a set of promises.' A contract is a right-
duty relation. In contracts social control is applied to prom-
ises which create such a right-duty relation.
Contracts, then, in the first place are a law of promises.
Mr Williston almost alone among the text writers on con-
tracts is entitled to credit for seeing this truth.2  Most text
writers on contracts have defined a contract as an agreement,
or as an agreement plus proniises under seal and of record.3
The reason for their doing this was probably because Black-
stone defined a contract as "an agreement, upon sufficient
consideration, to do or not to do a particular thing." De-
cisions of the courts have perpetuated the confusion of the
text writers.5 A definition of a contract in terms of an agree-
ment is inaccurate because it does not include three main
kinds of contracts promises under seal, promises for moral
consideration, and promises injuriously relied on. Those
definitions which include promises under seal are a little
better, but even they do not include promises for moral con-
sideration and promises injuriously -relied on. If the text
1 Willis, Introduction to Anglo-American Law, 37, 3 Proc. Am. Law Inst.,
173, 7 Ind. L. J. 429. The term contract is employed in other senses. Llew-
ellyn, What Price Contract, 40 Yale L. J. 704, 707, Restatement of the Law
of Contracts, see. I.
2 Williston on Contracts, sec. 1, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, sec. 1.
See also Harriman on Contracts, sec. 2. Bishop uses the term "promise", but
his use of the term is incoherent.
3 Addison on Contracts, sec. 1, Anson on Contracts, sec. 9; Andrews, Amer-
ican Law, p. 706, Bishop on Contracts, sec. 22; Chitty on Contracts (11th ed.),
pp. 5, 11, Clark on Contracts, sec. 2; Elliott on Contracts, sec. 1, Hare on
Contracts, p. 118, Helm on Contracts, p. 6, Lawson on Contracts, sec. 6,
Leake on Contracts, p. 6, Metcalf on Contracts, p. 1, Morawetz on Contracts,
p. 5, Paige on the Law of Contracts, sec. 49; Parsons on Contracts (7th ed.),
p. 6, Pollock, Principles of Contracts (9th ed.), p. 9; Salmond and Winfield
on Contracts, p. 1, Smith on Contracts, p. 40; Storey on Contracts, p. 1, Horton
on Contracts, sec. 1. The writer of this article made the same mistake when
he wrote his textbook on contracts twenty-five years ago. Willis on Contracts,
sec. 5.
4 II Blackstone Comm. 442. See also: II Kent's Comm. 449.
5 1 Words and Phrases 1513, 2 Words and Phrases 980; 3 Words and
Phrases 428, 4 Words and Phrases 541.
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writers and judges had used either the historical, or the
analytical, or the philosophical method they would have dis-
covered that Blackstone's definition was inaccurate. Histori-
cally, promises under seal, promises for moral consideration,
and promises injuriously relied on were perfectly good con-
tracts at the cime Blackstone wrote his Commentaries and
have been ever since. A comparison and analysis of the cases
would have shown this situation. Philosophical considera-
tions would have shown the necessity for all of these kinds
of contracts. Hence, in spite of the fact that almost all the
text writers and almost all of the judges have failed to define
a contract in the terms of a promise, the fact remains that
the only way a contract can be accurately defined is in such
terms. Text writers and judges simply have been wrong.
Mr. Williston is right.
A promise is an undertaking that something will, or will
not, happen in the future. If there is no promise, there can-
not be a contract of any kind. If there is a promise, there
may be a contract if it is accompanied by certain other opera-
tive facts. A contract requires more, but never less, than
a promise. Announcements, invitations for offers, statements
of opinion, prophecies, offers in known jest and promises on
condition of writing are not promises, because there is no
undertaking that 4nything will, or will not, happen. Where
there is such an undertaking, the first essential for a contract
exists.
Contracts, in the second place, are a law of rights. Con-
tracts are not promises or sets of promises. They are legal
relations. It is true there must be a promise or set of prom-
ises before there can be a contract, but this does not make the
promise or set of promises the contract. The contract is
what we actually have after the law gives operative effect to
the promise or set of promises. To define a contract as a
promise or set of promises would be like defining a house as a
tree or a set of trees. In this respect Mr. Williston is just
as wrong as he was right with respect to the necessity of a
promise. Most of the text writers heretofore cited have
6 7 Ind. L. J. 429; 3 Proc. Am. Law Inst. 172-175.
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been fairly accurate on this point, but special reference should
be made to Anson Pollock and Salmond.7
The problem, therefore, of determining when there is a
contract is the problem of determining to what promises the
law attaches legal obligation. In other words, it is the prob-
lem of finding out those promises which create a right-duty
relation.
The law does not make contracts out of all promises. There
is a social interest in being able to rely upon any promise that
any person may make. Our social order would be a better
social order if people could always rely upon every statement
that others might make. Human beings would be happier if
all of them always told the truth. Under these circumstances
it may be wondered why the law has not made contracts out of
all promises. The reason why it has not is probably a reason
of public policy Some promises are not of enough importance
to make it worth while to make contracts out of them. The
legal enforcement of all promises is expensive. No more
expense should be incurred for the enforcement of promises
than the needs of our social order make imperative. There
is a social interest in personal liberty; and personal liberty,
even the personal liberty to lie, ought not to be delimited un-
less the social interests of other people are thereby injured
enough so as to warrant the delimitation of personal liberty
Self-control is also a matter in which there is a social interest.
If social control was applied to all promises there would be
very little opportunity left for self-control. So far as it is
possible the making and performance of promises should,
therefore, be left to personal liberty
Yet, some promises are of such great importance that
social control must be applied to them. Not all promises can
be left to self-control. Wealth in a commercial age is largely
made up of promises. An important part of everyone's sub-
stance consists of advantages promised by others. There is
a demand of society that some promises, at least, be kept.
Hence, our Anglo-American law, much as all systems of law
have done, has compromised between enforcing all promises
7 Pollock, Principles of Contracts (9th ed.), Salmond & Winfield on Con-
tracts, p. 1, Anson on Contracts, sec. 3, Willis on Contracts, sec. S.
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and enforcing no promises, and as a result we have special
classes of promises to which this form of social control is
applied and which are contracts. Our problem, therefore
simmers down to a problem of determining these different
classes of promises.
What social control ought to be applied to promises is
hard to determine. Why we have the particular kinds of
social control characteristic of Anglo-American law is even
harder to explain. The political theory that that government
is best which governs the least, traceable to the government
by barons, is a satisfactory explanation of freedom of con-
tract, but when contracts are enforced by law so that people
are denied the freedom to break them, the argument for
freedom is more or less nullified. Now, of course, we even
control the freedom to make contracts. The economic theory
of laissez fatre also may be a rationalization of freedom of
contract, but it is not a rationalization of the social control ap-
plied to contracts; and economics have shown that freedom
of contract is not the best way to achieve the greatest common
good, because contracts too frequently favor one side. Un-
doubtedly, there is a religious explanation for a good deal of
our contract law Calvanism has been the faith of the com-
mercial classes. Men are instinctively repelled by the breaking
of a contract, and consequently contracts come to have a
sanctity Of course, if this were the basis for the law of
contracts, probably all promises should be enforced, but we
only enforce a few classes of promises. Metaphysically, con-
tract law might be justified on the basis of free will and the
adoption of the individual as the unit. Undoubtedly, the will
of the parties is inherently worthy of respect. But the
trouble with the metaphysical explanation is that there are
too many contracting parties, like employees, passengers, and
parties in fiduciary relation to other parties, who do not have
free will, and the law does not really enforce the will of the
parties, but general security and even things which the parties
did not foresee. Injurious reliance on promises is not a suffi-
cient explanation, because only a few injurious reliances on
promises are actionable. Most promises are actionable for
other reasons. The enforcement of promises because of an ex-
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change of equivalents is not required by modern law, with
such minor exceptions as to make the explanation negligible.
Formalism has something to do with the rationalization of
contract law, but it is not a general explanation. The distri-
bution of risks is certainly a partial explanation of the law
of contracts. Yet the parties contemplate performance, not
breach of contract, and the law sometimes grants specific
performance of them. It must be admitted, however, that
adjudications do distribute gains and losses. Perhaps all that
can be said is that the roots of contract law are many There
is no one explanation. The function of the Law of Contracts
is to standardize transactions, to make the path of enterprise
secure, to distribute gains and losses, and to continue to en-
force promises because they have been enforced in the past.
One class of promises, and historically the oldest of the
promises made contracts, is promises under seal. This form
of contracts was created in connection with the action of
covenant. At first this action was an action for breach of
every kind of promise enforced, oral or written, real or per-
sonal, but by the close of the reign of Edward I it would lie
only on a promise in writing under seal and delivered. This
kind of contracts has continued up to the present time, and
no further requirements are required even today for this
form of contracts." The requirement of the seal has changed.
At first it had to be an impression on wax," but now any scroll
or device will satisfy the requirements of a seal.10 At first
delivery had to be actual surrender, and in the United States
today there must be some putting of the document out of
possession with apparent intent," but in England apparently
intent alone is enough. 12 But even today a promise under seal
to be a contract does not require consideration,13 or acceptance
unless the promise under seal requires a return promise. 14
8 3 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, 114-126, 23 Publications of the
Selden Society, 43, 47. 0 Warren v. Lynch (1810), 5 Johns. 239.
10 Jackson v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1908), 233 Ill. 161, 84 N. E. 198.
11 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 102. Cf. Conveyances, Tiffany on
Real Property, see. 461.
12 Xenos v. Wickham (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. 296.
13 Restitement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 110.
I&I'.esL tement of Am, Law Inst., see. 105.
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Promises in writing, under seal and delivered are a very small
class of promises, and if this was all the contract law we had,
the subject of contracts would be a very small subject. How-
ever, this kind of contracts is not only the oldest and simplest
form of contracts which we have, but it is one for which
very good philosophical as well as historical reasons can be
found. The reaso~as for making promises under seal con-
tracts were because of their analogy to early religious sanc-
tions, when an oath was used, and because of the fact that
there is abundant evidence for proof of the promise.
Another class of promises made contracts is the promises
given for moral consideration. This kind of contracts grew
up out of the common law action of general assumpsit. It
had its chief development in the period of equity, and Lord
Mansfield did more than any one else to put it into the cate-
gory of contracts, but it is having some new growth in the
twentieth century This class of promises also is a very small
class. Even under Lord Mansfield, and those who were his
disciples, only a few promises were enforced for moral con-
sideration although Lord Mansfield alone would probably
have enforced all promises intended as a business transaction,
at least if in writing.'" The typical cases of promises enforced
for moral consideration are promises to pay a debt discharged
by the statute of limitations, 1 a promise to pay a debt dis-
charged in bankruptcy, 17 and a promise of a surety to pay a
debt in spite of his discharge.' 8 In all of these cases, except
the surety, the promisor has received pecuniary benefits for
which he has never paid. This creates sufficient moral obli-
gation so that the law holds a person liable on his subsequent
promise to pay even though he has technically been discharged
by a statute of limitations, or by a discharge in bankruptcy,
or some other rule of law For this reason a strong minority
of the cases will make any promise to pay for prior pecuniary
benefits a contract. These cases take the position that there
15 Pillans v. Van Mierop (1765), 3 Burrow 1663, Watson v. Turner (1767),
Bull. N. P 129; Hawkes v. Saunders (1782), 1 Cowper 289.
16 Clark v. Jones (1919), 233 Mass. 591, 124 N. E. 426.
17 Earle v. Oliver (1848), 2 Exch. 71 Zavelo v. Reeves (1913), 227 U. S.
625. 18 Hurlburt v. Bradley (1920), 94 Conn. 495, 109 At. 171.
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is just as much moral obligation to pay for pecuniary benefits
received where there was no prior legal obligation as there
is where there was a prior legal obligation. 19 Recovery is
allowed on such a promise even where there has been illegality
if the thing is merely malum prohibztum.20  Yet, even where
promises to pay for any prior pecuniary benefits are erected
into contracts the class of contracts identified with moral con-
sideration is very small, probably much smaller than the small
class of promises under seal.
A third class of promises made contracts is that of promises
injuriously relied on. This kind of promises was first made
contracts because of the action of special assumpsit. The
action of special assumpsit was regarded at first as a tort
action, and the root of liability was damage done by deceitful
artifice. But the action was gradually extended to an under-
taking to do something followed by malfeasance, then to an
undertaking to do something followed by misfeasance, and
finally to an undertaking to do something followed by non-
feasance. When the action was extended thus far it really
became a contract action, and promises were enforced be-
cause of injurious reliance thereon. This kind of contract
law might have become very extensive, except that it was
adequate only for promises followed by acts and not for
promises given for promises-that is, bilateral agreements.
Hence, to meet the need of a contract law for this kind of
promises the courts imported from equity and from the action
of debt the bargain theory of consideration, and, after doing
so, began to rationalize promises injuriously relied upon as
promises paid for by an act so as to bring unilateral situations
within the bargain theory 21 After this occurred there was
very little new development of the contracts created by prom.
10 Bently v. Morse (1817), 14 Johns. 468, Muir v. Kane (1909), 55 Wash.
131, 104 Pac. 153, Edson v. Poppe (1910), 24 S. D. 466, 124 N. W 441, Holland
v. Martinson (1925), 119 Kan. 43, 237 Pac. 902; Bagaeff v. Prokopik (1920),
212 Mich. 265, 180 N. W 427, Park Falls State Bank v. Fordyce (1931), 206
Wis. 628, 238 N. W 516.
20 Barnes v. Hedley (1809), 2 Taunt. 184, Brewster v. Banta (1901), 66
N. J. L. 367, 49 Atl. 718.
21 Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4, 53, Assumpsit, 3
Standard Encyclopedia of Procedure, 170-175, 192.
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ises injuriously relied on. However, these forms of promises
were not wholly eliminated. The promises of this sort which
continued to be enforced were gratuitous promises to convey
land, injuriously relied upon by the promisee entering upon
the land and making improvements,2 2 gratuitous promises of
a license, acted upon so that the licensee has serlously changed
his position; 23 charitable subscriptions, injuriously relied and
acted upon; 24 gratuitous promises of other gifts, reasonably
relied and acted upon to one's injury ;23 gratuitous undertak-
ings of bailees, reasonably relied upon; 20 and promises of
waiver, justifiedly relied upon.2 7 This kind of contracts also
bids fair to have some new development in modern times.
The American Law Institute, for example, has a provision
that: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and sub.
stantial character on the part of the promisee and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." But even
if this class of contracts should have some new development
it also will probably never become a very large class. The
basis for liability in this case is called the injurious reliance.
It really is not very different from the moral consideration
class of contracts. In the one case the promisor has received
pecuniary benefits for which he ought to be held liable, cer-
tainly if he makes a promise and sometimes in quasi contracts
without a promise, while, in the other case, the promisor
has caused the promisee to sustain an injury because of his
promise, but he ought to be held liable in one case as much
as in the other It should be noted that in both of these
classes of contracts only two things are required for the
22 Ames, Cases on Equity, 306-309.
23 Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Riley (1925), 9 Fed. (2d) 135.
24 Presbyterian Church of Albany v. Cooper (1889), 112 N. Y. 517, Young
Men's Christian Ass'n v. Estill (1913), 140 Ga. 291, 78 S. E. 1075.
25 Devecmon v. Shaw (1888), 69 Md. 199, 14 Atl. 464, Wilson v. Spry
(1920), 145 Ark. 21, 223 S. W 564.
26 Siegel v. Spear (1923), 234 N. Y. 479, 138 N. E. 414.
27 Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Century Realty Co. (1909), 220 Mo. 522,
119 S. W 400; Butt v. Butt (1883), 91 Ind. 305.
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contract a promise plus pecuniary benefits in one case, and a
promise plus injurious reliance in the other.
A fourth kind of promises which are made contracts is
promises of record. A contract of record is one resulting
from acknowledgment in court by a recognizer that he is
bound to make a certain payment unless a specified condition
is performed. 2s The reason why promises of this sort are
made contracts is much like the reason why promises under
seal are made contracts. They are probably the smallest
class of contracts.
The fifth and last class of promises which have been made
contracts is promises in the form of objective agreement, pro-
duced by offer and acceptance, and supported by the bargain
theory of consideration. Both of these requirements have a
common origin, but they differ from each other. They go
back to the action of special assumpsit. The promise injuri-
ously relied upon was given a twist so that the act following
the promise was required to be in exchange for a promise, and
the act was made to include a promise as well as actual acts
of performance. This was done to make a contract law for
bilateral agreements, but after this was done there was made
a new contract law for both oral and written promises and
for promises in the form of both unilateral2 and bilateral
agreements.30 Historically, the explanation for the bargain
theory of consideration is found in the law of consideration
developed by the equity courtss ' and in the requirement of a
quid pro quo by the old common law action of debt.3 2  Phil-
osophically the reason why the bargain theory of considera-
tion has bulked so large in Anglo-American history from the
seventeenth century on has undoubtedly been the fact that
the business man and his scheme of values have dominated
our economic life. The business man has thought that any
promise for which a price has been paid should be regarded
28 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 9.
20 Freeman v. Freeman (1615), 2 Bulst. 269.
SOThomas v. Thomas (1842), 2 Q. B. 851.
31 Salmond, History of Contracts, 3 Select Anglo-American Essays, 325-329,
336, 337.
32 Holmes, The Common Law, 286.
RATIONALE OF THE LAWI OF CONTRACTS
as a contract and enforced, and he has felt that no other
promise should be enforced, but he has not been able to
destroy the other kinds of contracts which we have already
considered. The reason why this new form of contracts
should also require an objective meeting of the minds brought
about by offer and acceptance is more difficult of explanation.
Undoubtedly there was at first the idea that there was some
special reason for enforcing promises when both parties to
the relation actually agreed upon the subject matter of the
promises, and there probably was implicit in this assumption
a notion of a meeting of the minds of the parties. 33  But
any subjective theory of agreement which may at first have
obtained has now very generally been rejected for an ob-
jective theory of agreement. 34
The act or promise which under this new law of contracts
had to be given in exchange for a promise seems, at first, to
answer the requirements of both the objective agreement and
the bargain theory of consideration, but this is not the case.
The bargain theory of consideration limits and narrows the
new law of contracts in that in order to be enough for the
bargain theory of consideration it required the act or promise
which might be enough for the objective agreement to be
either some legal right, power, privilege or immunity The
giving or the promise to give of either a right,35 or a power, 38
or a privilege, 3 T or an immunity38 is sufficient consideration,
but unless one of these things is given or promised to be given
there is no consideration. 30  An infant's promise and the
promises of those upon whom fraud, duress, or undue influ-
ence have been practiced are not exceptions to this rule. Each
33 Payne v. Cave (1789), 3 T. R. 148; Adams v. Lindsell (1818), 1 Barn.
& Aid. 681, Mactier v. Frith (1830), 6 Wend. 103.
34Tinn. v. Hoffman & Co. (1873), 29 Law T. R. (N. S.) 271, Stemmeyer
v. Schroeppel (1907), 226 Ill. 9, 80 N. E. 564.
35 Bidder v. Bridges (1887), 37 Ch. Div. 406, Willis, Consideration in the
Anglo-American Law of Contracts, 8 Ind. L. J. 93, 112.
36 White v. McMath and Johnson (1913), 127 Tenn. 713, 156 S. W 470.
3 7Hamer v. Sidway (1891), 124 N. Y. 538, 27 N. E. 256.
38 7 Ind. L. J. 434.
30 Davis & Co. v. Morgan (1903), 117 Ga. 504, 43 S. E. 732; Vanderbilt v.
Schreyer (1883), 91 N. Y. 392; McDevitt v. Stokes (1917), 174 Ky. 515, 192 S.
W. 681.
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of these parties, in order to make a voidable contract, must
promise to give up a right, power, privilege or immunity If
he does so there is sufficient consideration for his contract.
The fact that he may avoid the contract for infancy, or fraud,
or duress, or undue influence does not touch the matter of
consideration and the making of a contract, but is an inde-
pendent power given to him by the law to void a contract
after it has once been made. 40  Pre-existing legal duty cases
and forbearance to sue cases also are not exceptions to this
rule because in such cases, according to the majority viewpoint,
where a person does not have a privilege to sue another
person,41 or a privilege to rescind or to offer a rescission of
an existing contract, 42 there is no consideration. Of course,
a person has the physical power to institute a malicious prose-
cution or to breach a contract, but a-promise to give up such
a power will not create a contract because of illegality, and
it may be said that the illegality affects the consideration so
that there is not sufficient consideration. The requirement of
a legal right, power, privilege or immunity by the bargain
theory of consideration has finally developed until it has
become a mere technical requirement; and no real price is
paid for a promise, except where that phase of the bargain
theory called the equivalent theory prevails in the exchange
of sums of money 43
What we have said would be a sufficient rationale of prom-
ises which are contracts were it not for the statute of frauds.
The statute of frauds, originally enacted in England in 1677
and re-enacted in the United States by the different states of
the Union, places a further limitation upon contracts. By
this statute, really enacted to protect the social interests
against perjury, certain promises are not allowed to become
contracts unless they are accompanied by further operative
facts. In the case of the promise of an executor to answer
40 Willis, Rationale of Past Consideration and Moral Consideration, 19
Iowa L. Rev. 395, 396.
41 Wade v. Simeon (1846), 2 C. B. 548, Willis, Consideration in the Anglo-
American Law of Contracts, 8 Ind. L. J. 93, 114.
42 De Cicco v. Schweizer (1917), 221 N. Y. 431, 117 N. E. 807, Willis, Con-
sideration in the Anglo-American Law of Contracts, 8 Ind. L. J. 93, 154, 170.
4a Schnell v. Nell, (1861), 17 Ind. 29.
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damages out of his own estate, or the promise of any person
to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
or a promise or agreement in consideration of marriage, or
a promise (contract) for the sale of land, or a promise
(agreement) not to be performed within one year from the
making thereof, before the promise can become a contract,
the promise, or agreement, or some memorandum thereof
must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged. And
in the case of a promise (contract) for the sale of goods for
the price of ten pounds (or some other price varying from
$30.00 to $500.00) before the promise can become a contract,
the promise (or bargain) or some memorandum thereof
must be in writing, signed by the parties to be charged, or
there must be a receipt and acceptance of the goods or part
of them, or something in earnest to bind the bargain, or part
payment.
There is no doubt that the statute of frauds applies to
promises in the form of agreement so that if there is an
agreement which relates to any one of the kinds of promises
covered by the statute of frauds there must be not only an
objective meeting of the minds and the bargain theory of
consideration, but there must be a satisfaction of the statute
of frauds before the law will regard the promise or promises
as contracts.44 DQes the statute of frauds apply to the other
kinds of promises which are made contracts? It does not
apply to promises under seal.45 The promise under seal has
to be in writing anyway, but if the courts had taken the posi-
tion that the statute of frauds applied thereto, they might
have also required consideration, since the courts have inter-
preted the memorandum required by the statute of frauds to
be a memorandum setting forth the consideration and all of
the other essentials of a bilateral contract. This the courts
44 Willis, The Statute of Frauds: A Legal Anachronism, 3 Ind. L. J. 427,
532, 536, Cincinnati Trac. Co. v. Cole, (1919), 258 Fed. 169; Lake View Hos-
pital v. Nicholson (1916), 202 I1. App. 205, Clack v. Rico Exploration Co.
(1922), 23 Ariz. 385, 204 Pac. 137.
45Rann v. Hughes (1778), 7 T. R. 350; Aveline et al. v. Whisson (1842),
4 Man. & G. 801, 134 Eng. Rep 330, 331, Parks v. Hazlerigg (1845), 7 Blackf.
(Ind.) 536, Cherry v. Heming and Needham (1849), 4 Exch. 632, 154 Eng.
Rep. 1367.
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have not done. The statute of frauds also must be held
not to apply to promises for moral consideration,46 promises
injuriously relied upon,47 and promises of record. 48  In spite
of the fact that the statute of frauds generally uses the word
"promise," the occasional use of the word "agreement" and
the word "contract" perhaps tend to show that the drafters
of the statute had in mind only promises in the form of agree-
ment. The moral obligation of the defendant in such cases
also gives the courts an excuse to ignore the statute of frauds.
At any rate this seems to be the construction which the courts
have put upon the statute.
The law makes contracts of each of the five kinds of prom-
ises above considered. The one common fact in all of these
contracts is a promise, but each one of these contracts re-
quires more than a promise. In the case of promises under
seal, before the law will make the promises contracts, there
must also be a seal and writing and delivery In the case of
promises for moral consideration there must be the fact
either of a moral obligation which was once a precedent debt,
or prior pecuniary benefits. In the case of promises injuriously
relied upon there must be the fact of injurious reliance. In
the case of promises in the form of agreement there must
be the further facts of an objective expression of assent by
means of offer and acceptance, the bargain theory of consider-
ation, and satisfaction of the statute of frauds. If all of these
operative facts exist, the law will make contracts of each one
of the kinds of promises which we have named.
Before the law will allow promises to become contracts,
that is, apply social control instead of allow personal liberty,
it also requires competency on the part of promisors though
not of promisees. A corporation, for example, cannot make
46 In promises for mol-al consideration the courts have never suggested
the applicability of the statute of frauds and probably no promises will ever
be made for the statute to apply to anyway.
47 If part performance is sufficient to take a contract to sell land, and per-
formance by one party is sufficient to take a contract not performable in one
year, out of the statute, injurious reliance should have the same effect if the
statute otherwise would apply.
48 The statute of frauds should not apply to promises of record for the
same reason it does not to promises under seal.
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a contract unless it has been authorized so to do in its char-
ter 40 Most courts hold void an infant's power of attorney
and all his other attempted contracts if he is under guardian-
ship.50 All attempted contracts of a person non compos mentis
are void after he has been adjudged incompetent. 51 At the
common law, the attempted contracts of a married woman
were void. 52 All other parties generally are competent to
make promises which the law will make contracts. Promises
which the law will make contracts may be made by one person
alone, or by two or more jointly, or jointly and severally, and
they may be made to one person, or to two or more jointly, or
jointly and severally 53 This is true as to all of the different
classes of contracts which are recognized by the common law
The law will make contracts out of such promises whether
they are under seal, for moral consideration, injuriously re-
lied upon, or in the form of agreement, or of record. The
only importance of such promises is in the matter of such
questions as suit and survivorship. Promises also will be
made contracts by the law even though they are made for
the benefit of third party beneficiaries instead of for the benefit
of the promisees. These promises also may be under seal
or in the form of agreement. 54 Whether or not promises for
moral consideration and promises injuriously relied upon may
be made for the benefit of third persons is unimportant, be-
cause promises of this sort are not made. Where promises
are made for the benefit of third party beneficiaries the law,
if the other conditions precedent to contracts exist, creates
contracts both for the promisees and the third party bene-
ficiaries. 55 Promises which have been made contracts by the
law are capable of assignment, so far as contract rights are
concerned, either by another promise which the law will make
a contract or by a gift. This is a modern development of the
law At first the common law found very great difficulty in
40 Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839), 13 Pet. 519.
50 Trueblook v. Trueblood (1856), 8 Ind. 195.
5' Wait v. Maxwell (1827), 5 Pick. 217.
52 Jackson v. Vanderheyden (1819), 17 Johns. 167.
53 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 111.
54 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 134.
55 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 135, 136.
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permitting any one other than a party to a contract to acquire
the right thereunder, but this difficulty was finally overcome
through the use of the device of a power of attorney, al-
though the development had to be worked out by the courts
of equity " A person may make, through an agent as well as
by himself, promises which the law will treat as contracts.5 7
The social control which the law will apply to promises will
depend very much upon whether the promise is an independent
promise or a dependent promise. If the promise is independent
the possibility of a requirement of performance is more im-
minent than where the promise is dependent. A dependent
promise may depend upon the happening of some casual act
or event, or upon the performance of another promise. In
the first case, the act or event is a casual condition. In the
second case, the promise is a promissory condition. If the
condition is one which must occur before the obligation of a
promise arises it is called a condition precedent. If it must
occur at the same time as the obligation of a promise it is
called a concurrent condition. If it must occur after the
obligation of a promise it is called a subsequent condition.
The law of conditions is a law of performance. In all such
cases the law recognizes the promise or promises as a contract.
The condition simply affects the performance of the con-
tract.58 The social control is exerted either to postpone the
duty of immediate performance until the happening of a con-
dition, or to discharge the duty of performance upon the
happening of a condition, or to regulate the order of the
performances.
We have now considered all of the promises which the law
will make contracts. There are some other promises which
the law will enforce for example, gratuitous declarations of
trust,"9 promises of accommodation endorsers of bills and
notes, 0 and stipulations of attorneys. 61  However, these
56 Mowse v. Edney (160), Rolle's Abr. 20 pl. 12; Redfield v. Hiilhouse
(1764), 1 Root. 63, Legh v. Legh. (1799), 1 Bos. & Pul. 447
57 Willis on Contracts, sec. 122, 126.
58 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 250 et seq., 7 Ind. L. J. 435.
59 Perry, Trusts, 96.
60 Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, sec. 29.
61 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 94.
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promises are not as yet contracts, but are enforced for other
reasons, though perhaps they should be absorbed by contracts.
The only promises which the law will at present enforce as,
contracts are the five different classes of contracts which we
have heretofore discussed. If promises conform to the pat-
terns of these different kinds of contracts the law will apply
social control to them. Otherwise, it will apply no social con-
trol for their enforcement. Any other social control which
it may apply to them will have to be the kind of social control
which we are going to consider hereafter.
Ii.
The law also applies some social control to promises which
are not as yet contracts, but which are made with a view to
contracts. These kinds of promises do not occur in the case
of promises given for moral consideration, or promises injur-
iously relied upon, or promises of record, or promises under
seal, unless in the last case the promises are what are called
option contracts. In the case of an option the promisee has a
right as well as a privilege and power . 2 But these kinds of
promises always occur in the case of agreement. The only
way whereby the law will permit parties to create an agree-
ment is by means of offer and acceptance. e3 In the case of
a unilateral agreement the offer consists of a conditional
promise for an act. In the case of a bilateral agreement the
offer consists of a conditional promise for a promise. In
both cases the offeree is thereby given a privilege and power
of acceptance. In the case of a unilateral agreement he may
exercise his power by doing the act required by the offer. In
the case of a bilateral agreement he may exercise his power
by making the promise called for by the offer in the manner,
at the place, and within the time designated by the offer, ex-
pressly or impliedly Unless the offer is in the form of an
option, either under seal or for consideration, the offeror also
has a power of revocation of his offer. In the cases now under
consideration the law will not apply social control to make
02 McMillan v. Ames (1885), 33 Minn. 257, 22 N. W 612.
03Tinn v. Hoffman (1873), 29 Law T. R. (N. S.) 271.
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either the offeree or the offeror exercise his power, or outside
of option cases to restrain either from exercising his power;
that is, the law will not exercise any social control to compel
performance. This seems to indicate that the law exercises
no social control whatever. Yet, this is not true because the
law does recognize the existence of the powers to which we
have just referred. It will recognize them as sufficient con-
sideration for other promises, and if they are exercised, the
law will give operative effect to them either as destroying
another power or as creating a new right. The law also will
permit a person to waive a privilege or power by a mere state-
ment to that effect.0 4  For these reasons it must be agreed
that the law does exercise social control over these preliminary
promises in that it makes them create privileges and powers
even though it does not make them create rights. 5
III.
The law applies social control to promises to discharge
contracts, but for the law to exercise this social control the
same operative facts are required which are required for the
making of a contract.00 If the promise to discharge is a
promise under seal it is called a release and must have all
the essentials of a promise under seal.0 7 If the promise is in
the form of a novation, either simple or compound, this prom-
ise must have consideration and probably the bargain theory
of consideration and agreement. 8 If the promise is a promise
64 W'll;s. Rationale of Past Consideration and Moral Consideration, 19
Iowa L. Rev. 104.
Illustration of waivers of privileges and powers are often found in the
law of offer and acceptance, the law of agency and the law of insurance.
Some of the best illustrations are found in the law of insurance. Madden v.
Interstate Business Men's Ac. Ass'n. (1917), 139 Minn. 6, 165 N. W 482.
De Francisco v. Zurich Gen. Ac. & Lia. Ins. Co. (1926), 105 Conn. 162, 134
Atd. 789.
05 Willis, Introduction to Anglo-American Law, 45.
60 Foakes v. Beer (1884), L. R. 9 App. Cas. 605.
07 Braden v. Ward (1810), 42 N. J. Law 518.
O8 Smart v. Tetherly (1878), 58 N. H. 310; Perry & Walden v. Gallagher
(1919), 17 Ala. App. 114, 82 So. 562.
RATIONALE OF THE LAIP OF CONTRACTS
of rescission,6" or a promise of a substituted contract, 70 or
a promise of an acord, 71 the same thing is true.
IV
The fourth kind of social control applied to promises is
the social control applied to prevent promises from becoming
contracts. To most promises probably the law applies no
social control whatever but leaves their making and perform-
ance to the personal liberty and sense of morality of individu.
als. To the five different kinds of promises heretofore dis-
cussed the law applies the social control characteristic of
contracts. There is another list of promises to which the law
applies social control, not to enforce their performance, but
rather to prevent their performance. Where the law applies
social control -to hold people to their promises it does so in
order to protect the social interest in promised advantages
and in the security of transactions. Where it applies social
control to keep people from performing then promises it
does so in order to protect a great variety of other social
interests.
The problem in such cases is to determine when the law
should apply social control to prevent the formation of con-
tracts. Before it will do this it must come to the conclusion
that the object to be accomplished by the contracts is unsocial.
Who determines this conclusion? The makers of the law
representing the people, either the legislatures if they so de-
clare and the courts hold that their action is constitutional,
or the courts, where legislatures do not expressly declare.
Many old cases were decided arbitrarily and accidentally with-
out the needed judicial balancing of the interest in freedom
of contracts and in legal transactions against the many other
important social interests of the day Distinctions between
nalum zn se and malum prohibitum are inadequate expressions
of this fundamental truth. Juggling with "statutory interest,"
and "collateral illegality" only confuses the courts and pre-
60 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 406.
70 Bandman v. Finn (1906), 185 N. Y. 508, 78 N. E. 175.
71 Good v. Cheesman (1831), 2 Barn. & Adol. 328.
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vents their approaching the subject from the true standpoint.72
The true distinction is, which in any given case is more im-
portant, promised advantages and the security of transac-
tions on the one hand, or other social interests (like general
security of the person, domestic relations, substance, or social
institutions, or general morals, or the conservation of social
resources, or general progress) on the other hand. If the
first, the law will apply the social control called contracts, if
the second, some other social control.
It will be impossible to enumerate all of the promises upon
which the law puts a ban. There are hundreds of crimes and
a great many torts. A promise though under seal or for
consideration, whose purpose is the commission of a legal
wrong of any one of these sorts, is one which is so illegal
that the law will not permit it to be enforced.73 All that will
be attempted in this place is an enumeration of a few of the
most striking and frequent instances of promises to do illegal
things. One class of promises of this sort is found in promises
in restraint of trade. If a promise is not ancillary it will
always be declared illegal, and even if it is ancillary the law
will balance the social interest in freedom of contract, general
security, and protection of business on the one hand, and
the social interest in livelihood and in social resources and
general progress on the other hand. If the promise is neces-
sary for the protection of a business it will probably be up-
held,74 but if it is not necessary for the protection of a business
it will probably not be upheld. 75  Other promises which are
illegal are those in the form of wagers, 76 lotteries and
gambling transactions. The social interest protected by the
refusal to make contracts out of these promises is a social
interest in good morals. Usurious promises also are illegal
because of the social interest in economic progress. 77 Promises
made or to be performed on Sunday, except for mutual prom-
72 Gilhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 Col. L. Rev. 679.
73 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 512, sections 571-579.
74 Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt etc. Co. (1894), L. R. App. Cas. 535.
75 Herreshoff v. Boutineau (1890), 17 R. I. 3.
76 Collamer v. Day (1829), 2 Vt. 144.
77 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 526.
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ises to marry and those involving works of necessity and
charity, are generally made illegal by statute in order to pro-
tect the social interest in religious institutions. 78  In the same
way, promises which tend to obstruct the administration of jus-
tice because of involving maintenance, 71 champerty, 80 or bar-
ratry,81 compounding a crime,82 or paying a witness contingent
compensation, 83 or paying for the suppression of evidence, 84
or paying for the prosecution of fictitious litigation, 3 or un-
reasonably limiting the tribunal to which resort may be had,8 6
are all illegal. Promises of this sort are found in promises
to influence the members of a legislative body otherwise than
by presenting facts and arguments to them (lobbying) ,87
promises to induce a public official to make a certain appoint-
ment," promises to procure a pardon, 0 promises to procure
the location of a railroad or other public facilities in a manner
opposed to public interest,0 promises to increase or diminish
compensation of a public official fixed by law,9 1 promises of
a public board to employ one of its members for compen-
sation.02  The social interest protected in this case is also the
social interest in political institutions. Promises in restraint
of marriage,13 or for marriage brokerage,0 4 or for separation
and divorce, 0 or to change the essential incidents of mar-
rige,00 or to marry another person when one is already
78 Skinner Irr. Co. v. Burke (19-19), 231 Mass. 555, 121 N. E. 427.
70 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 541.
80 Hutley v. Hutley (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 112.
81 Ellis v. Frawley (1917), 165 Wis. 381, 161 N. W 364.
82 Williams v. Baily (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 731.
83 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 552.
84 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 554.
80 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 556.
86Restatement of Am Law Inst., sec. 558.
87Trist v. Child (1874), 21 Wall. 441.
88 Meguire v. Corwine (1879), 101 U. S. 108.
80 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 561.
00 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 564.
91 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 565.
02Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 566.
93 Lowe v. Doremus (1913), 84 N. J. Law 658, 87 At. 459.
04 Duval v. Wellman (1891), 124 N. Y. 156, 26 N. E. 343.
95 Stratton v. Wilson (1916), 170 Ky. 61, 185 S. W 522.
96 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 587.
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married,9 7 are illegal. The social interest protected by this
form of social control is the social interest in domestic institu-
tions.
Promises of the above sorts and hundreds of other prom-
ises like them are illegal, either on common law grounds or
statutory grounds. In such cases the law will not allow them
to become contracts. No one will be permitted to sue in the
courts to recover damages for their breach. Ordinarily, the
law will do nothing whatever about them. It will not help a
person to obtain performance -from another nor a person who
has rendered performance to get it back.98 It, however, in
any proceeding which involves such promises, will declare
them illegal and void. Sometimes, also, it will punish crim-
inally those who have made such promises.
In the case of illegality the law says it will leave the parties
where it finds them. In truth it does not do this. For ex-
ample, it gives title or possession to one party in case of the
delivery of a chattel sold on Sunday, and then refuses to do
anything for the other party A few decisions make the
bargains void and place the parties in statu quo. Professor
Cook makes a convincing argument for the position of the
minority 19
This fourth kind of social control is applied to all promises.
It makes no difference whether the promises are supported
by bargain consideration, or moral consideration, or injurious
reliance, or are promises under seal or of record. If any
of these promises are illegal, the law will not allow them to
become contracts. The illustrations heretofore given and
those usually found in the textbooks and reports involve
promises in the form of agreement. However, it is settled
that the same social control is applied to promises under
seal'00 and on principle it should apply to promises for moral
consideration, promises injuriously relied on, and promises
of record. A promise, as for example, to murder another
97 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., see. 588.
98 McLean v. Wilson (1889), 36 Ill. App. 657, law makes no exception
in favor of infants.
99 Cook, Rescission of Bargains Made on Sunday, 13 N. C. L. Rev. 165.
10oPage on Contracts, sec. 1057.
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man, is just as illegal if for moral consideration or injuriously
relied upon as it would be if for bargain consideration. How-
ever, such kind of promises as a matter of fact are not made
and it is almost impossible to think of their being made.
V
The last class of promises to which social control is applied
is those promises which are voidable. This class of promises
includes promises made by infants and promises procured by
fraud, duress or undue influence. In such cases the law will
apply the first form of social control, which we have discussed,
to make the promises contracts. In addition, it will apply a
new form of social control, to allow the infant or the party
upon whom fraud, duress or undue influence has been prac-
ticed to avoid the contract. It does this by giving such person
a power of avoidance and permitting him to exercise this
power either by ex parte help or by a suit at law for the
rescission of the contract.10 This social control, like that
applied to promises whose object is illegal, is not applied
because of the social interest in promised advantages or the
social interest in the security of transactions, but because
of other social interests. In the case of infants it is the social
interest in human. resources, in the case of fraud it is the
social interest in morals and substance, and in the case of
duress and undue influence it is the social interest in the
freedom of the will. In protecting these social interests
social control does not go as far as it does in the case of
illegality so as to prevent the promises from becoming con-
tracts. It allows them to become contracts. But after they
have become contracts it protects these social interests by
giving a power of avoidance to the party of whom advantage
has been taken and liability in tort for deceit. The other
party is held to his promise because of the social interest in
promised advantages. The party allowed to avoid. will be
held to his promise for the same reason if he does not elect
to use his power. But the social interests referred to are
101 Restatement of Am. Law Inst., sec. 431, 19 Iowa L. Rev. 396.
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important enough so that the law protects them by giving
the injured party a power of avoidance if he chooses to use it.
The power of avoidance for the causes enumerated applies
in principle to all the classes of contracts. It makes no differ-
ence what the class of contract, if it was made by an infant, 102
or was procured by fraud, 10 3 duress, 10 4 or undue influence, 0 5
it may be avoided. This is true whether the contract is a
promise under seal, 10 6 or a promise for moral consideration,
or a promise injuriously relied on, or a promise in the form
of agreement, or a promise of record. A promise to pay a
debt barred by the statute of limitations or a discharge in
bankruptcy made because of duress, or fraud or undue influ-
ence should be voidable just as much as a promise in the form
of agreement procured by such means. An infant should
be allowed to disaffirm one such promise as much as another
The same reasons for avoidance of one kind of promises apply
to the avoidance of all.' 07
102 Sheafe v. Kimball (1851), 21 Fed. Cas. No. 12729a.
103 Hopkins v. Beard (1856), 6 Calif. 664.
104 Brown v. Pierce (1868), 7 Wall. 205.
100Peterson v. Budge (1909), 35 Utah 596, 102 Pac. 211.
106 Hopkins v. Beard (1856), 6 Calif. 664.
107 It should be noted that mere promisees in contracts under seal, con-
tracts for moral consideration, and contracts created by injurious reliance
do not have any power or privilege of avoidance of the contracts; these legal
capacities are given only to promisors in such cases. Of course infants, for
example, like any other promisees have a power of disclaimer. Restatement
of Am. Law Inst., sec. 104.
SPECIAL NOTE
The writer believes that the subject of contracts should be taught accord-
ing to the rationale set forth in this article, and in his classes at Indiana
University he follows this policy. Promises under seal are studied first. Then
promises for moral consideration are taken up. After that, promises injuriously
relied on are considered. Finally, promises in the form of objective agreement,
produced by offer and acceptance and requiring &he bargain theory of considera-
tion, are thoroughly studied. In this way the different types of contracts are not
only studied in their historical order but so separately that the principles
of one are not confused with those of another. The student, for example,
does not get the idea that contracts under seal require consideration or that
the seal imports consideration; nor the idea that there has to be offer and
acceptance in contracts founded on moral consideration or on injurious re-
liance; nor the idea of privileges and powers preliminary to contracts outside
of promises in the form of objective agreement and options under seal.
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After finishing these fundamental and distinctive types of contracts, the
statute of frauds is considered, and the question of its application to all these
types of contracts is studied. WVith this problem out of the way, third party
beneficiaries, assignees and joint parties are cons.dered, and their relation
to each type of contract determined. Following these topics performance,
discharge and illegality follow in order. The power of avoidance for infancy,
fraud, duress and undue influence is studied for the most part in other courses.
Of course there is no case book built just on this plan, although the writer
devoutly wishes there was, but he has been able to use the regular case books
by rearranging their material.
